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LAW OF WAR DEVELOPMENTS ISSUE
INTRODUCTION
David Glazier∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review publishes a
special edition in which five competitively selected students write
articles on individual topics within a larger area of law that is
undergoing significant contemporary evolution. This issue continues
that tradition, focusing on emerging developments in the law
governing armed conflict, traditionally known as “the law of war,” or
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), as it is now increasingly
being called.
The cliché that “9/11 changed everything” rings particularly true
with respect to public discussion of this subject. Prior to
September 11, 2001, interest in the law of war was largely confined
to military officials and scholars; a handful of civilian organizations,
such as human rights groups and the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC); and those directly involved with the practice of
international criminal law. Only a few U.S. law schools offered
courses addressing the subject, and the term “war” was seemingly
applied to metaphorical battles against problems like cancer, crime,
drugs, and poverty more often than to actual armed conflict. While
many remember President George W. Bush reading Florida
schoolchildren a book about goats during the World Trade Center
attacks, few now recall he was doing so as part of the “War on
Illiteracy” he had declared just the previous day.1

∗ Professor of Law and Lloyd Tevis Fellow, Loyola Law School Los Angeles.
1. See, e.g., Stephen Hegarty, Bush Calls for War on Illiteracy, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(Sept. 11, 2001), available at http://www.sptimes.com/News/091101/Worldandnation/Bush_calls
_for_war_on.shtml.
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When Bush first spoke about a “war” against terrorists the day
after 9/11,2 it was thus unclear whether he meant this was to be
another figurative fight or an actual armed conflict. Until that time
terrorism had been treated almost exclusively as a criminal matter,3
and the president himself had spoken about the need “to find those
responsible and to bring them to justice” in his public address the
previous evening.4 But over the next few weeks it became clear that
this was meant to be an actual “war.” Congress quickly enacted an
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) permitting the
president to conduct hostilities against both those responsible for the
attacks and those that had aided or sheltered them.5 Two United
Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions referenced the United
States’ right of self-defense,6 while the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) recognized 9/11 as the only armed attack on a
member state justifying collective military measures in the alliance’s
half-century of existence.7 Any residual doubts about the actuality of
this conflict were dispelled by the October 7, 2001, launch of
offensive combat operations against targets in Afghanistan under the
moniker “Operation Enduring Freedom,” beginning what has
become the longest war in U.S. history.
Despite specific past tense language in AUMF authorizing
hostilities only against those responsible for the 9/11 attacks (al
Qaeda) and any entity that had aided or sheltered them (the Afghan
Taliban), however, President Bush soon began referring to a “global
war on terror” and eventually broadened the scope of hostilities to
include groups such as the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban)

2. George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity with the National
Security Team, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 12, 2001, 10:53 AM EDT), http://georgewbush
-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html.
3. See, e.g., David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda Within the Law of
War, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 966–69 (2009).
4. George W. Bush, Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE (Sept. 11, 2001, 8:30 PM EDT), http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/rem/71940.htm.
5. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012)).
6. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (both referencing the inherent right of self-defense in their
preambles).
7. See NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., Countering Terrorism, http://www
.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_77646.htm? (last updated Apr. 8, 2015 4:57 PM).
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which did not even exist in 2001.8 And although the Obama
administration publicly backed away from the controversial “global
war” terminology, it nevertheless continued the expansion of U.S.
military operations to target additional organizations such as Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Somalian Al Shabaab group,
both of which were also founded well after 9/11.9
Collectively, these events have had the practical consequence of
transforming the law of war from a comparatively obscure discipline
into a matter of common concern for anyone endeavoring to
participate in informed public discourse about post-9/11 U.S.
national security policies. Treating terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and
the Taliban—a group asserting to be the legitimate government of
Afghanistan yet recognized as such by only three other Islamic
nations—as adversaries in an armed conflict gives rise to a number
of challenging legal questions. International legal rules governing
armed conflicts between actual states are well developed. But the
Bush administration quickly concluded that the best-known law of
war provisions—those found in the four Geneva Conventions of
194910—were inapplicable to al Qaeda, which was not a state, and
that Taliban fighters failed to qualify for Convention protections due
to their failure to wear uniforms or follow the law of war.11 The
unique attributes of this conflict have resulted in continuing
uncertainty about which existing legal provisions should apply,
complicating the assessment of decisions to rely upon law of war
authority to for such matters as targeting (including the subsequent
use of armed drones), indefinite detention, and military trials of

8. See, e.g., David Glazier, The Drone—It’s in the Way That You Use It, in PREVENTATIVE
FORCE: TARGETED KILLING AND TECHNOLOGY (Kirsten Fisk & Jennifer M. Ramos ed.)
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 4) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2563657.
9. Id. at 4–5.
10. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S.
85 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
11. Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to the Vice
President et al., Humane Treatment of Taliban and Al Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available
at http://www.pegc.us/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf.
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suspected terrorists. The importance of these questions has led to
burgeoning scholarly interest in this field. By 2007, 96 out of 101
U.S. academics responding to a joint American University-ICRC
survey reported that IHL was now being taught at their institutions,
either as a stand-alone course or at least covered topically within
another course,12 while a 2015 Westlaw search found that a
remarkable 6,200 law review articles published since 9/11 include
the term “law of war” in their text.13
This new enthusiasm for law of war issues extends beyond the
overall conduct of the so-called “war on terror.” The increasingly
frequent use of the internet as a means to disrupt economic or
governmental functions across borders, or even across the globe, has
led to extensive discourse and theorizing about “cyber warfare,” for
example. And today’s remote controlled drones have stimulated
prognostication and debate about a future expected to prominently
feature “autonomous weapons” that will make independent decisions
to kill without human intervention.
Given these developments, it is not surprising that most law
students now express some interest in law of war issues.14 But I was
still a bit apprehensive when approached by this law review’s Chief
Developments Editor and asked to serve as the faculty advisor for
this issue, which would feature student-written articles on topics they
would select from the broad scope of this overall body of law. I knew
that the review’s highly competitive Developments selection process
would yield very bright, and highly motivated, students who were
capable researchers and writers. But as a dedicated law of war
scholar, I have all too often been disappointed by the efforts of
12. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS & WASH. COLL. OF LAW, TEACHING INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW AT U.S. LAW SCHOOLS 7, available at https://www.wcl.american.edu/
humright/center/documents/IHLSurveyReport.pdf.
13. The author searched WestlawNext selecting just the “Law Reviews & Journals”
checkbox under “Secondary Sources” for exact phrase “law of war” and date after 09-11-2001 on
March 29, 2015, returning exactly 6,200 results. An entry-by-entry review of the first one
hundred returns found that twelve had appeared in military journals; the remaining eighty-eight
included a broad range of articles published in general and specialty journals. A review of the first
one hundred entries from a similar search of work before 9/11 found that fully 40 percent of the
works incorporating the phrase “law of war” were from military publications while many of the
civilian publications were shorter notes, book reviews, and even a memorial notice.
14. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS & WASH. COLL. OF LAW, supra note 12, at 8
(reporting 92 percent of students surveyed are “interested” or “very interested” in legal issues
related to the “war on terror” with 96 percent reporting that level of interest in law governing
“armed conflict”).
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otherwise impressive professional commentators who have been
enticed to leap into the post-9/11 publication fray by the “sexiness”
of these topics but lacked the requisite background knowledge to
produce credible contributions to this field. I was thus a bit skeptical
as to whether law students without any prior grounding in this
complex subset of international law would be able to produce work
that would meaningfully advance our understanding of the issues
they addressed. In hindsight I need not have worried. I now have the
significant honor to being able to state categorically that each of the
pieces comprising this volume does, in fact, offer important original
insights that would do a professional academic proud!
II. CLASSIFYING THE CONFLICT WITH AL-QAEDA
The first article, written by Andrew Beshai,15 takes on the
substantial challenge of locating the conflict against al-Qaeda within
the two overall conflict classifications—international and
non-international-recognized by the law of war. When this conflict
began back in the fall of 2001, the answer seemed relatively
straightforward. To get to Osama bin Laden and the core of his
terrorist organization, the United States committed military forces to
an intervention in Afghanistan, engaging in direct hostilities against
both al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the latter the de facto governing force
of that nation. Although President Bush concluded that the specific
provisions of the Geneva Conventions were inapplicable to these
groups, the government nevertheless considered this to be an
international armed conflict,16 and felt entitled to draw authority
from the applicable body of governing law for such collateral
purposes as justifying the detention, and military trial, of opposing
forces.17
This straightforward understanding was called into question five
years later, however, when the Supreme Court halted military
commission proceedings against Osama bin Laden’s erstwhile driver
and sometime bodyguard, Salim Hamdan. The Court found that the
commission failed to measure up to either requirements of the
15. Andrew Beshai, The Boundless War: Challenging the Notion of a Global Armed Conflict
Against Al-Qaeda and Its Affiliates, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 829 (2015).
16. Bush, supra note 11.
17. See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 § 1(e) (2002) (calling for military
detention and trial of members of al Qaeda).
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Uniform Code of Military Justice or to fair trial standards found in
Common Article 3 (CA3) of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the
single provision in those treaties applicable to non-international
armed conflict.18 In reaching this result, the Court determined that it
“need not decide” the merits of the harder question of whether the
full texts of the 1949 Conventions, applicable only to international
conflicts “between two or more of the High Contracting Parties”
applied.19 Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court noted the
government’s argument that al Qaeda, as a non-state group, could not
qualify as a “High Contracting Party”20 before concluding that the
conflict would then, by default, be “not of an international character”
and CA3 would thus apply.21 (He then went on to demonstrate that
the Guantánamo commissions as being conducted at that time failed
to satisfy CA3’s requirement for trials by a “regularly constituted
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensible by civilized peoples.”)22 Stevens’ simplistic linguistic
conclusion has subsequently been widely adopted without serious
question, and the U.S. government now tends to treat its fight against
al Qaeda and associated groups as a single non-international armed
conflict spanning a number of diverse countries.23
The problem with this approach is that it fails to comport with
either the facial language of CA3 or the legal logic underlying
international law’s bifurcation of conflict types. Read more fully,
CA3 explicitly states that it applies to an “armed conflict not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties.”24 The use of the word “one” in this context is
not coincidental; it reflects the core reason why non-international
conflicts have always been subject to less international regulation
than their intra-state counterparts. Prior to the international
recognition of human rights in the UN Charter, international law
essentially only regulated states in their external dealings with one

18. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006).
19. Id. at 629–30 (quoting Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 628–30.
22. Id. at 631–35 (quoting Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions).
23. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, The Armed Conflict with Al Qaeda, OPINIO JURIS
(May 6, 2011, 11:54 PM EDT), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/06/the-armed-conflict-with-al
-qaeda/.
24. Geneva I; Geneva II; Geneva III; Geneva IV.
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another. It made sense for them to accept mutually binding, and
advantageous, restrictions on their conduct of hostilities with one
another, and a robust body of international conflict regulations has
been developed over the last two centuries.25 But states were
reluctant to accept any external regulation of their conduct when
dealing with non-state adversaries (i.e., rebels) within their own
territory. These situations involved conflict against individuals who
were breaching a duty of loyalty to the state they were fighting; that
is to say, they were committing treason. And because the conflict
was taking place within the state’s own sovereign territory, it could
bring the full scope of its domestic laws to bear, obviating the need
for any international legal authority for such matters as detention or
trial of opposing fighters.
The recognition of international human rights after the Second
World War meant that states logically accepted the intrusion of
international law restrictions into their domestic conduct for the first
time, and it thus made sense that the 1949 Geneva Conventions
included the initial, albeit minor, restrictions on state conduct of
non-international hostilities.26 But the application of these lesser
restrictions—as compared to the robust regulation of international
armed conflicts—was contingent upon the restricted geographic and
political scope of the conflict. This was implicitly reconfirmed by the
Additional Geneva Protocol II (APII) of 1977 that provided a modest
expansion of the protections afforded by CA3. APII’s application
was thus expressly limited to conflicts “which take place in the
territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups . . . .”27
APII made another significant contribution to the definition of
non-international armed conflicts, explicitly requiring the existence
of a sufficient level of sustained violence for a situation to constitute
qualifying hostilities. The second paragraph of APII’s Article 1
declares that “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a

25. See, e.g., ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR
1–10, 22–25 (3d ed. 2000).
26. See id. at 24.
27. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II) art. 1, ¶ 1,
June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 609.
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similar nature” do not qualify as armed conflicts.28 This floor
logically precludes application of law of war rules to many
situations, requiring the application of ordinary criminal law
governed by human rights standards instead of military force.
Justice Stevens’ determination that the U.S. conflict with al
Qaeda was non-international may have made sense for the limited
purpose he intended—to establish that even the minimalist
protections of CA3 were sufficient to establish the fatally flawed
nature of the Guantánamo military commissions. But the broader
implication that the United States might have the right to strike
foreign nationals in distant states subject only to the modest
limitations associated with non-international armed conflict defies
logic given that the very legal foundation of those rules is based on
the prerequisite of a sovereign state acting within its own territory.
Beshai’s article provides a logical, and highly original,
conceptualization for reconciling these contradictions. He argues that
rather than considering the conflict against al-Qaeda—which clearly
does not qualify as a nation-state—and its various branches to be a
single legal entity, we should adopt an “epicenter of hostilities”
approach in which we disaggregate the overall conflict into a series
of subcomponent parts, each located in an individual nation in which
violent activity is focused. In some instances it may be determined
that the situation within that nation fails to satisfy the level of
ongoing violence necessary to establish the legal existence of an
armed conflict. Where that is the case it will be necessary, as a
matter of law, to treat the local perpetrators as criminals and rely
upon domestic law enforcement rules and processes to counter the
threat (as has traditionally been done with the vast majority of all
terrorist acts to date, including the only actual terrorist uses of
weapons of mass destruction—the nerve gas attacks carried out by
Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo cult). Where the situation does lawfully rise
to the level of an armed conflict, Beshai makes a strong case that it
should be treated as a non-international armed conflict between the
local state and the terrorist group, in which case international law
allows the United States (and other concerned third states) to
intervene in support of the affected state if it so requests. While this
approach would logically impose greater limits on U.S. freedom of
28. Id. at art. 1, ¶ 2.
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action than the current essentially unilateral approach, it
offers substantial advantage in terms of soundly grounding
counter-terrorism efforts within recognized legal rules and avoids the
establishment of new precedents for military intervention in the
territory of non-consenting third states which will ultimately
contribute to a less stable and less secure world order.
III. COMPENSATING FORMER GUANTÁNAMO
DETAINEES FOR MISTREATMENT
The second article in this issue is Cameron Bell’s insightful
examination of the government’s obligation to compensate former
Guantánamo detainees.29 Treating 9/11 as an armed attack and the
subsequent conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban as a “war”
allowed the United States to draw upon longstanding international
legal authority to preventively detain opposing fighters for the
duration of hostilities.
The details of this authority, however, are clouded by the
government’s failure to coherently identify which governing
international legal rules apply; it has instead seemed to focus its
energy on detailing which do not, exempting, for example, al Qaeda
from any application of the Geneva Conventions at all while
unilaterally concluding that Taliban fighters fail to qualify for their
specific protections even if the treaties are otherwise applicable to
Afghanistan. It has further endeavored to avoid legal scrutiny via the
employment of offshore detention facilities, most prominently at the
U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Not surprisingly, then,
Bush administration lawyers such as John Yoo and Jay Bybee
articulated broad authority to engage in coercive interrogation
practices that objective observers would consider to constitute
torture.
A total of 779 men and boys have been detained at Guantánamo;
115 remained there as of May 2015 including 51 who had previously
been cleared for release.30 The vast majority of those detained were
“sold” to the United States or coalition forces in response to bounty
29. Cameron Bell, Repatriate . . . Then Compensate: Why the United States Owes
Reparation Payments to Former Guantánamo Detainees, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 867 (2015).
30. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Guantánamo by the Numbers, www.aclu.org
/infographic /guantanamo-numbers?redirect=national-security/Guantanamo-numbers (last visited
July 14, 2015).

824

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:815

offers, only 8 percent were considered by the government to be
“Al-Qaeda fighters.”31 Many of these men have been subjected to
extremely harsh treatment, some to outright torture. But the
government has never admitted any wrongdoing nor offered any of
these men compensation, or even an apology. To paraphrase Erich
Segal, it seems to have adopted the mantra, “Guantánamo means
never having to say you’re sorry.”
Bell examines the history of Guantánamo detention and the
surrounding legal issues, particularly the application of the
euphemistically titled “enhanced interrogation techniques.” After
providing compelling evidence that U.S. detainee treatment
constituted significant violations of international law, she explores
state obligations to provide reparations under both customary legal
rules governing state responsibility as well as specific treaty
obligations under the Convention Against Torture.32 Bell then
examines the complete lack of success detainees have had pursuing
compensation via such vehicles as the Alien Tort Statute,33 Federal
Tort Claims Act,34 and Torture Victim Protection Act35 despite the
U.S. international legal obligations to provide remedies for this sort
of conduct. She offers plausible recommendations for judicial
correction of this deficiency before ultimately concluding that the
detainees’ best hope lies in getting foreign nations to pursue the issue
on their behalf under international legal principles of state
responsibility.
IV. DETENTION OF U.S. CITIZENS AWAY FROM
THE THEATER OF WAR
The third article is an analysis by Diana Cho of the current status
of U.S. authority to detain its own citizens in the ongoing war.36 This
question is complicated by the existence of a federal statute, “the
Non-Detention Act”37 enacted to prevent recurrence of unilateral
31. Id.
32. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
34. Id. § 1346 .
35. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 106 Stat. 73, note following 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
36. Diana Cho, The NDAA, AUMF, and Citizens Detained Away from the Theater of War:
Sounding a Clarion Call for a Clear Statement Principle, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 927 (2015).
37. Non-Detention Act, Pub. L. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347 (1971) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)
(2006)).
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executive-branch deprivations of liberty such as the World War II
internment of Japanese Americans. The Non-Detention Act flatly
declares that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained
by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”38 In its
2004 Hamdi decision, Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion
concluded that the AUMF was sufficient to implicitly authorize
executive detention, even of a U.S. citizen being held in the United
States, because this “is so fundamental and accepted an incident to
war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’
Congress has authorized the President to use.”39 The conclusion that
the AUMF was a qualifying statutory authorization received a fifth
vote from Justice Thomas, who otherwise dissented from the Court’s
remand for further judicial consideration, arguing that the
government had already met its burden of justifying Hamdi’s
captivity.40
The Court’s approval of Hamdi’s continuing detention was
conditioned upon the fact that the petitioner was an “enemy
combatant” who was “part of or supporting forces hostile to the
United States or coalition partners” who had “engaged in conflict
against the United States” in Afghanistan.41 It left open the issue of
what other limits on detaining citizens might apply, including
whether Americans could be preventively detained if captured
outside a theater of active hostilities. This specific issue was
presented to the Court in the concurrent case of José Padilla—a
citizen detained upon return from travel to South Asia at Chicago’s
O’Hare airport. But in a decision handed down the same day as
Hamdi, the justices deferred reaching the merits, holding instead that
Padilla was suing the wrong party (the Secretary of Defense rather
than his immediate custodian) in the wrong court (the Southern
District of New York rather than South Carolina where he was then
being held).42 The government ultimately charged Padilla with
ordinary terrorism related crimes and convicted him in a regular
federal court, mooting any further challenge to his military detention.
Meanwhile Hamdi, a dual U.S.-Saudi national, was released shortly
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
Id. at 586–87, 594–99 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 516 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
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after the Court’s decision in his case in exchange for agreeing to
renounce his American citizenship.43 The Court has thus not had the
opportunity to offer any further guidance with respect to the
detention of U.S. citizens in the ongoing conflict.
While the Court has not been heard from again, Congress has
somewhat ambiguously reentered the fray. In December 2011, it
included language in the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 which explicitly affirmed presidential
authority under the AUMF for military detention of anyone who
“who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban,
or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners . . . .”44 This language made no
exception based on nationality or location of capture. But a
subsequent paragraph declares, “Nothing in this section shall be
construed to affect existing law or authorities relating to the
detention of United States citizens, lawful resident aliens of the
United States, or any other persons who are captured or arrested in
the United States.”45 A minor firestorm of public debate followed;
some argue that the government already had the authority to detain
citizens regardless of where they were captured so the NDAA didn’t
change anything; some argue that the government did not have this
authority previously and that the language about “nothing in this
section . . .” means that they still do not; and some argue that the
NDAA does in fact represent a substantial expansion of U.S.
detention authority.
Cho’s informative article examines the legal authorities and
history underlying this controversy in detail. In order to protect
American’s civil liberties, she argues that the Non-Detention Act’s
protection of citizens against executive detention should only be
trumped by a “clear congressional authorization,” and concludes that
the ambiguous AUMF and NDAA language should be considered
insufficient for this purpose.
V. CYBER ATTACKS AS WARFARE?
Ryan Patterson contributes the fourth piece in this issue, a
critical examination of another post-9/11 development, the increasing
43. Id.
44. Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 § 1021(b)(2) (2011).
45. Id. § 1021(e).
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use of the internet as a way to inflict harm remotely, and assessment
of appropriate state responses to this challenge.46 In most cases the
harm inflicted has been in the form of nuisance or economic
interference with the functionality of particular websites, or general
disruption of regular internet activity. But in at least one infamous
instance—the use of the Stuxnet virus against Iranian nuclear
centrifuges—the remote cyber activity actually inflicted physical
damage.
Both pundits and government officials have been quick to label
activity of this type as “cyber warfare.” As part of this rush to treat
cyber threats as actual, rather than metaphorical, conflict, a group of
leading law of war practitioners and scholars came together under
NATO auspices to produce the Tallinn Manual, a handbook for
applying existing customary international law rules to these new
developments.47 The U.S. government has gone farther, establishing
the United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and the Army
has just formally launched a new career branch, “Cyber Officer,”48
providing an alternative to service in more traditional specialties
such as Armor, Artillery, Infantry, and Intelligence.
Bucking this trend, Patterson provides a concise explanation of
internet functionality and terminology being used in this field before
exploring a number of difficulties with the classification of cyber
activity as warfare. He ultimately concludes that states would
generally be better served by prosecuting cyber incidents as crime
under domestic law, seeking reparations for violations from
responsible states, and emphasizing improved domestic
cybersecurity over focusing on militarization of the problem.
VI. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS’ MISTAKES
In the final article in this issue, Kelly Cass takes us from the
present into the realm of future warfare, examining the issue of
accountability for killing civilians by autonomous weapons, or
46. Ryan Patterson, Silencing the Call to Arms: A Shift Away from Cyber Attacks as
Warfare, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 969 (2015).
47. Int’l Grp. of Experts, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2013), available at
http://issuu.com/nato_ccd_coe/docs/tallinnmanual?e=5903855/1802381.
48. Jim Tice, Attention Officers: Sign up Soon for Cyber Transfers, ARMY TIMES (Apr. 16,
2015), available at http://armytimes.com/story/military/careers/army/officer/2015/04/16/army
-cyber-voluntary-transfer-incentive-program/25811401/.
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“killer robots” as many critics choose to derisively term them.49
While current U.S. drone use seems to have been a catalyst for much
of the recent discussion on this subject, Cass begins by clarifying the
important distinction between current remotely operated systems,
which retain direct human control over all targeting decision, and
actual autonomous weapons which, once activated, identify and
engage targets without further involvement of a live individual. She
notes that fully automated robots are in existence today, such as the
U.S. Navy’s Phalanx Close-In Weapons System, but that the real
concern is future weapons that will have some degree of “artificial
intelligence,” rendering their future acts less predictable.
Some participants in the robotic warfare debate have gone so far
as to suggest that autonomous robots might themselves commit war
crimes for which the machine should be held accountable. Cass
demonstrates, however, that machines are incapable of the human
thought process necessary to satisfy the mens rea requirements of
criminal law. She then evaluates the ability of these robots to comply
with the foundational principles of the law of war before considering
possible avenues for specific regulations or prohibitions concerning
their use. She concludes that existing regulations can fairly be
understood to limit autonomous weapons to use against non-human
targets, an interpretation which would effectively guard against the
parade of horribles most “killer robot” critics postulate.
The final part of Cass’s article provides a careful analysis of the
potential financial and criminal liability for impermissible robotic
killing. After considering each possible agent, she concludes that
responsibility should lie just where it does for any other weapons
system, with the operator who makes the decision to employ the
weapon, as well as with the commander(s) responsible for that
individual’s performance.

49. Kelly Cass, Autonomous Weapons and Accountability: Seeking Solutions in the Law of
War, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1017 (2015).

